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Abstract  
 
Violent conditions burn in the background of daily life. Consider the slow wounds of 
ecological violence, the crumbling cityscapes of austerity, or the mental trauma inflicted by 
capitalism. In this paper, we provide an account for understanding violence in and through 
conditions, drawing on the work of Johan Galtung and Gilles Deleuze in particular. Violent 
conditions are not the property of individuals or monolithic structures: they are the 
existential climates by which localized subjects and worlds condense into being. In making 
this argument, we not only advance scholarship on the geographies of violence, but also 
make a sustained case for how and why condition is an important social, political, and 
ontological heuristic. Our examination is framed by unearthing the complex conditions and 
discontents of capitalism. Violent conditions forcefully constrain, traumatize, and poison, 
the very resources of our becoming. Accordingly, we provide a map for exploring the 
geographies of violent conditions across four interrelated sections. (1) The Virtual, (2) 
Truncated Life, (3) Time, (4) Common Sense. Collectively, these explain how violence is 
embedded in the flesh and bones of our worlds. The paper finishes by discussing the 
injustices of being and the possibilities for peace. 
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Introduction 
  
Violent conditions burn in the background of daily life. Consider the slow wounds of 
ecological violence (Nixon, 2011), the crumbling cityscapes of austerity, or the mental trauma 
inflicted by what Mark Fisher (2009) terms capitalist realism. In his classic 1845 study, The 
Condition of the Working Class in England, Friedrich Engels outlines his task as follows: to 
prove that English society routinely commits “social murder.” Workers, he writes, are placed 
“under conditions in which they can neither retain health nor live long; that it undermines 
the vital force of these workers gradually, little by little, and so hurries them to the grave 
before their time” (Engels, 2009, p. 127). Moreover, “I have further to prove that society 
knows how injurious such conditions are to the health and the life of the workers, and yet 
does nothing to improve these conditions” (Engels, 2009, p. 128). Engels’ vivid polemic 
highlighted the injustices of being: the violent conditions that pervaded, harassed, and 
choked Victorian workers in Manchester, sending them to early graves. And the conditions 
that Engels denounced so long ago have not disappeared. 
 
The idea of social murder gained popularity in the wake of the tragic Grenfell Tower block 
fire of 2017. Many blamed government-imposed austerity for priming the conditions for the 
deadly inferno in London. The Shadow Chancellor, John McDonnell, said: “The decision not 
to build homes and to view housing as only for financial speculation rather than for meeting 
a basic human need by politicians over decades murdered those families” (quoted in Syal, 
2017). As David Madden (2017, np.) adds, “working class and poor communities were living 
and working in conditions that were conducive to disaster.” Geography, of course, has long 
studied how various conditions are worlded (McCormack, 2017; Shaw, 2012). From 
economic conditions (Harvey, 1989), to ecological conditions (Bagelman and Wiebe, 2017), 
to psychological conditions (McGeachan, 2014), geography maps the inescapable 
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situatedness of being. To put it simply: to exist is to be affected by conditions (see Anderson 
2014). But the idea of condition is only implicitly understood despite its ubiquitous use. 
Accordingly, our task in this paper is to conceptualize violence in and through conditions.  
 
What are conditions? Conditions are the very geographies of being: the existential resources 
that nourish and sustain, but also harm and violate. Conditions are not the property of 
individuals or monolithic structures: they are the existential climates by which localized 
subjects and worlds are condensed into being. What we term violent conditions are those 
geographies of being that restrict the potential for life to flourish and actualize (see Tyner, 
2016). This advances Galtung’s (1969, p. 168) definition of violence as “the cause of the 
difference between the potential and the actual” in a world. Understanding violence in and 
through conditions discloses the insidious, atmospheric, and unjust matters and senses of 
existence.  
 
To make these arguments, we build on the philosophy of Gilles Deleuze (1994) to define 
condition as a localized space of formed and unformed matters (see also Marston, Jones III, 
& Woodward, 2005; Woodward, Jones III, & Marston, 2012). On the one hand, this enables 
us to understand violence through its actualized circumstances and forms, the “conditions 
lying outside and impinging on human life” (McCormack, 2017, p. 7). On the other hand, by 
conceptualizing the virtual nature of condition—its unformed matters, energies, and 
potentials—we provide an account of how conditions individuate subjects, transduce worlds, 
and constrain the possible in the fabric of being. Together, this enables us to locate “the 
material, self-organizing conditions through which situated politics emerge” (Woodward, 
Jones III, & Marston, 2012, p. 217).  
 
Over the past decade, violence has been named, declared, classified, memorized and attested 
to across the discipline. In their recent special issue, Springer and Le Billon (2016) state that 
the geographies of violence is an important yet emerging area of disciplinary research. There 
has been research on military and state violence (Gregory and Pred, 2007), systemic violence 
(Laurie, 2015), intimate violence (Pain, 2014, 2015), ecological violence (Bagelman and 
Wiebe, 2017), police and legal violence (Wall, 2016), or various forms of urban violence 
(Graham, 2010). Yet rarely is the term violence itself scrutinized. Perhaps this is because 
violence is “complex, mimetic and protean” (Springer and Le Billion, 2016, p. 1)—a “slippery 
concept … nonlinear, productive, destructive and reproductive” (Scheper-Hughes and 
Bourgois, 2004, p. 1). As such, the paper responds to multiple calls across political 
geography (Inwood, & Alderman, 2014; Pain, 2014; Tyner & Inwood 2014; Tyner), to 
advance “a much larger and unfolding research agenda” in the field of geographies of 
violence (Springer and Le Billion, 2016, p. 3). Our aim in this paper is therefore twofold. 
First, we advance recent scholarship on the geographies of violence (Doel, 2017; Pain, 2014; 
Tyner and Inwood, 2014; Tyner, 2016). Second, we make a sustained case for why condition 
is an important social, political, and ontological heuristic. 
 
In the remainder of this paper we sketch a map for navigating the ontopolitics of violence. 
Our overriding concern is how injustice embeds itself in the flesh and bones of the world—a 
world that is never above or below the human subject but threaded into its very fibres. In 
what follows, we review existing scholarship on violence in and beyond geography. We then 
turn to the philosophies of condition in the work of Hannah Arendt (2013), Gilles Deleuze 
(1994), Felix Guattari (1989), and also Deleuze and Guattari (2004). This examination is 
framed by unearthing the complex conditions and discontents of capitalism. As David 
Harvey (1989, p. 336) noted in The Condition of Postmodernity, “It is never easy, of course, 
to construct a critical assessment of a condition that is overwhelmingly present.” After that, 
we unite both violence and conditions to produce a geography of violent conditions. This 
cartography is drawn over four interrelated sections: (1) The Virtual, (2) Truncated Life, (3) 
Time, and (4) Common Sense. We close the paper with a summary of our main arguments—
oriented by the theme of injustice—and chart pathways to more peaceful conditions. 
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On Violence 
  
In this section, we establish foundational philosophical and geographical approaches to 
understanding violence. Hannah Arendt (1969, p. 82) argues that violence belongs to “the 
political realms of human affairs.” A similar rejection of violence as a natural condition is 
forwarded by Scheper-Hughes and Bourgois (2004). They sketch the socio-cultural 
conditions for constructing violent subjects. As they argue: “We are social creatures. … We 
reject the view that violence is fundamentally a question of hard-wiring, genes or hormones 
... brute force is a misnomer … Sadly, most violence is not ‘senseless’ at all” (2004, p. 3). 
There is a political imperative for the rejection of violence as an intrinsic, genomic facet of 
human existence. As this paper explores, there is an intimate relationship between violence 
and capital. There is a risk that when we collectively naturalize or fetishize violence we 
“forever serve the interests of those who seek to profit through oppressive and exploitative 
practices” (Tyner and Inwood, 2014, p. 11). Moreover, rejecting the normalisation of violence 
is the first step in imagining more peaceful subjectivities and crafting more peaceful worlds 
(Koopman, 2011). We reach for peace by first grasping violence as a concept (Inwood, 
Alderman, & Barron 2016). It is unsurprising then, that we first turn to the founder of Peace 
Studies, Johan Galtung, for “everything now hinges on making a definition of violence” 
(1969, p. 168). 
  
Through his sustained intellectual engagement with the very concept of violence, Galtung 
has offered us a typology of violence, what he terms a “(vicious) violent triangle” (1990, p. 
294) comprised of direct, structural, and cultural violence. As such, Galtung called for a 
capacious definition of violence: one that moves beyond the direct, physical violence 
perpetrated by an identifiable actor, towards structural and institutional forms of violence. 
This is the type of diffuse violence that stunts an individual’s ability to develop and realize 
their full potential. This is not a utopian potential, but perfectly realizable. Accordingly, 
Galtung (1969, p. 168) defines violence “as the cause of the difference between the potential 
and the actual, between what could have been and what is.” Violence inhabits this gulf. 
Crucially, Galtung understands violence as both that which increases the gulf and, more 
potently, that which fails to close the gulf. This shifts away from a comprehension of violence 
as an intentional act towards a constraint-based ontology of violence: where doing nothing is 
a cause of harm, the “ontological rupture between ‘killing’ and ‘letting die’” (Tyner, 2016, p. 
2). 
  
Similarly, Žižek (2008) splits violence between its subjective and objective manifestations. 
For Žižek, society’s fixation on the subjective violence (such as terrorist attacks) emerges as a 
very deliberate distraction from the objective violence that greases the wheels of capitalism. 
Indeed, this focus on subjective or direct violence not only commands popular 
interpretations of violence, but, as Pain (2015) argues, dominates academic enquiry. This 
direct violence is depicted as a “sporadic, singular episode or set of such episodes ... as the 
exception to the norm” (Lawrence & Karim, 2007, p. 11). Alternatively, Galtung recognises 
the violence built within systems. Such structural violence is not partitioned spatially or 
temporarily. And the perpetrator of violence is not clearly recognizable (Galtung & Höivik, 
1971): it can be bureaucratic (Cooper and Whyte 2017; Gupta, 2012), anonymous, and 
abstract (Laurie 2015). In many instances, death through structural violence is a result of a 
series of social and political process that make life killable prior to any act (Butler, 2004; 
Lopez and Gillespie, 2015). 
  
Beyond the Binary 
  
Many have (re)turned to Galtung for his initial provocations on structural (over direct) 
violence. Yet Galtung (1990) augments this understanding by detailing how direct and 
structural violence both require the auxiliary role of cultural violence to function. Cultural 
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violence, “preaches, teaches, admonishes, eggs on, and dulls us into seeing exploitation 
and/or repression as normal and natural, or into not seeing them … [as] ‘right’ or at least not 
‘wrong’” (1990, p. 291). Cultural violence hides the spectacular violence within the “symbolic 
sphere of existence” (Ibid.). Violence is rendered banal and everyday through its repeated 
exposure and representation. As Lawrence and Karim (2007, p. 5) write, at “its first 
eruption, violence is always experienced as unique. If given time and repetition, however, it 
becomes routine, part of the air and one learns how to breathe it without being asphyxiated. 
One no longer seeks to eliminate it, more even to understand it.” Of course, this mutation 
from the spectacular to the banal has a racialized, gendered, and uneven geography to it, 
whereby deaths in certain spaces, or deaths of certain populations, are barely even marked 
(Butler, 2004; Pratt, 2005). 
 
There is important work within feminist geopolitics and gender studies that recognises such 
“bodies at the sharp end” (Dixon and Marston, 2011, p. 445; see also recent special section 
“Embodying Violence” in Gender, Place and Culture edited by Fluri & Piedalue, 2017). For 
feminists, of course, the personal has always been political. Mountz (2017) laments that 
political geography is still slow to engage the body as an analytical site upon which power is 
exercised. Work that that traces the intimate gendered violence has been essential in 
producing more critical geographies of violence (see Brickell and Madrell, 2016; Fluri, 2011, 
2012, 2011; Hyndman, 2007; Pain, 2014, 2015; Sweet, 2016). This body of work has been 
vital to “dismantle and re-think the analytical separation between different violences” (Pain 
2014, p. 82) and provide an appreciation of violence as a “multi-faceted and multi-sited force 
– interpersonal and institutional, social, economic and political, physical, sexual, emotional 
and psychological – violence is endemic, and intimately interwoven with other sorts of 
relations” (Pain and Staeheli, 2014, p. 344). 
 
Accordingly, it is important to move beyond dichotomous understandings of violence as 
either direct or structural, “as though each of these forms has its own a priori existence in 
and of itself” (Tyner & Inwood, 2014 p. 779). By thinking through violence as a condition, we 
hope to further move beyond the binary, in an attempt to “unite these seemingly opposite 
abstract forms into their historical and geographical totalities” (Tyner & Inwood, 2014, p. 9). 
As previously mentioned, Tyner and Inwood (2014), Springer and Le Billion (2016), and 
Loyd (2009), have all recognised the need for geographers to better comprehend violence in 
it is multiple forms—critical of how geographical analyses leave violence “separated out, 
positioned as either local/everyday or as international/political conflict” (Pain and Staeheli, 
2014, p. 344).  
  
The Conditions of Capitalism 
   
In the section above we reviewed approaches to understanding violence. Now, we unpack 
philosophies of condition. This is oriented by examining the conditions of capitalism, a 
principal source of injustice. Conditions, writes Anderson (2014, p. 161), are akin to 
“structures of feeling,” or “mediums through which ordinary affective life is lived and 
organised (Anderson, 2014, p. 161). Capitalism is an important medium for organizing 
affective life (see Springer, 2013; Tyner, 2016). In his definition of social murder, Engels 
(2009) located violence within the social conditions of capitalism. Marx, too, recognized the 
“everyday violence that is often hidden in plain sight” (quoted in Evans & Carver, 2017, p. 2). 
Galtung (1990, p. 293) places capitalist “exploitation as [the] centerpiece” of structural 
violence.” In what follows, we begin by reviewing Marxist understandings of conditions. We 
then move to Immanuel Kant and Hannah Arendt’s thoughts on (human) conditions, before 
moving into the pre-subjective conditions of capitalism in the work of Deleuze and Guattari. 
In doing so, we investigate conditions across their (a) social, (b) human, and (c) pre-
subjective articulations under capitalism. 
  
Social Conditions 
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Hardt and Negri (2009) argue that capitalism and law combine in the “republic of property,” 
a structure that is able to “determine and dictate the conditions of possibility of social life in 
all its facets and phases” (2009, p. 8, our emphasis). The idea that capitalism is a kind of 
“meta” social condition is well established. As Marx first elaborated, his method of historical 
materialism details how social change emerges through “a series of material conditions of 
existence, which in their turn are the spontaneous product of a long and tormented process 
of development” (1990, p. 173). Throughout Capital, Marx (1990) details the various 
technical and social conditions of capitalism. Surplus populations, for example, are “a 
condition of the existence of the capitalist mode of production” (Marx, 1990, p. 784). Marx 
thus offers an important construct across Capital: what he terms “the material conditions of 
existence,” a phrase he often repeats (e.g. 1990, pp. 223, 273, 556, 784). 
  
Building on this, Harvey (1989, p. 111) discusses various capitalist conditions of existence: 
alienation, fragmentation, creative destruction, speculative development, and 
transformations of space and time. For Harvey (1989, p. 111), these conditions outlast and 
exceed their seemingly antagonistic social expressions (such as the social configuration of 
postmodernism, the target of Harvey’s analysis). Conditions are thus understood as 
resources that nurture the shifting configurations of worlds and subjects. For example, 
Bourdieu (1977, p. 95, quoted in Harvey, 1989, p. 219), writes that “the habitus is an endless 
capacity to engender products - thoughts, perceptions, expressions, actions - whose limits 
are set by the historically and socially situated conditions of its production.” In short, 
humans are thrown into, and limited by, the socially situated conditions they find themselves 
within, “not according to free choice, however, but under pre-existing, given and handed-
down conditions” (Sloterdijk, 2011, pp. 46-47). 
  
Despite the spatial and historical variance in the worlding of conditions (that is, their 
localization in place), they can outlast their specific materializations. Conditions are 
emergent complexes that generate a “seemingly infinite range of outcomes out of the 
slightest variation in initial conditions” (Harvey, 1989, pp. 343-344). In this sense, 
conditions are similar to the climates from which fleeting weather patterns emerge--the 
atmospheres by which social reality condenses. A condition doesn’t simply define what is, or 
what must be, but what can be: the fields of potential that nourish the already-existing. We 
are thus arguing for a movement away from violence as a purely subjective condition, to an 
understanding of how violence conditions subjects. This further requires unpacking the 
metaphysical legacy of conditions. 
  
Human Conditions 
  
Can we think of condition-in-itself, or is it--and must it always be--qualified by something 
else, such as a thinking subject (which an overly social understanding of conditions implies)? 
In Critique of Pure Reason, Kant (1998) examined the transcendental conditions of 
representation. These were the faculties of the human mind that structure an otherwise 
chaotic reality. Kant argued that both space and time were innate forms of human intuition. 
As Keith Woodward (2010, p. 323) explains, “With Kant, space becomes a universal and 
necessary condition for making sense of ‘my’ perceptions, and thus ‘my’ understanding does 
not represent the world as it ‘really is’... but is a synthesis of the specific ways it appears for-
me.” 
  
Kant’s subject is not, however, free-floating (as with conventional readings of Descartes): it 
doesn’t choose to represent. Rather, it is through sensation that an “I think” spontaneously 
arises as a reference point for the organization of sensory data (Woodward, 2010, p. 324). 
Nonetheless, this synthetic cognition is fundamentally for-me: the integrity of reality is 
possible because of the human conditions that Kant outlines in the structures of mind. But 
what if we were to reverse Kant’s synthesis, so that we understand conditions as the fields of 
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reality by which the subject is possible? In other words, what if we move from subjective 
conditions to conditions of subjectivity? Unlike Kant’s transcendental idealism, what 
Deleuze (1994) calls transcendental empiricism discloses the subject as the site of 
experience, as synthesis itself, the very event by which condition--as a vital milieu--quite 
literally makes sense of itself. “Ontologically speaking, this unshackles spontaneity from its 
enslavement to a transcendental consciousness, returning it to the complicated, self-
differentiating forces of materiality” (Woodward, 2010, p. 328). The subject is suddenly 
disclosed as a product as much as a producer of conditions. 
  
There are a number of ways to understand this production of subjectivity. Throughout The 
Human Condition, Arendt (2013) states that since the industrial revolution, humanity has 
been remade by capitalism. Arendt, as with Marx, understands conditions not as innate 
structures of the human mind, but as worldly forces. Humans, she writes, are intimately 
connected to various conditions: life, natality, mortality, worldliness, plurality, and finally 
the earth itself (Arendt, 2013, p. 11). But beyond these raw, earthly conditions, exist artificial 
conditions. Humans craft what Arendt calls an artifice, an artificial world of objects that 
conditions them. “[Humans] are conditioned beings because everything they come in contact 
with turns immediately into a condition of their existence” (Arendt, 2013, p. 9). Condition is 
not solely an earthly force, but is bound to the materials, things, objects, and forces that 
humans fabricate, what Arendt (2013, p. 9) calls “conditioners of human existence.” Yet 
despite embedding conditions within the world, these are separate from a pre-formed 
human subject. Arendt is tied to the notion that although humans are conditioned beings, 
they are ontologically distinct from such conditions. 
  
This separation between condition and subject is often repeated in accounts of how 
condition and worlds are paired. World is imagined as the gathering of human and 
nonhuman elements. Consequently, world is a concept that “remains implicated in a human-
centered, phenomenological account of spacetime” (McCormack, 2017, p. 2). As Angela Last 
(2017, p. 74) adds, “With the rise of new materialisms, the ‘world’ appears to have fallen out 
of favour as an unwieldy, amorphous entity that contains too many indistinctive human-
nonhuman constellations to be of any use.” A strong anthropocentric reading of conditions 
thus foreclosures their ability to generate either subjects or worlds. But we insist that the 
starting point for world and subject is their embryonic genesis in conditions (see Marston, 
Jones III, & Woodward, 2005; Woodward, Jones III, & Marston, 2012). Humans do not live 
“in” or “on” a world of res extensa, but are always-already immersed and worldly—in the 
midst of conditions. There is no pure starting point between condition, world, and subject, 
just endless syntheses. To understand these syntheses we now turn the work of Deleuze and 
Guattari and their thoughts on the pre-subjective conditions of capitalism. 
  
Pre-Subjective Conditions 
  
Deleuze and Guattari’s (2004) transcendental critique of capitalism takes place without a 
thinking subject. In Kant’s (1998) revision of Cartesianism, the cogito is not a substantial 
entity, or a ghostly thinker, but a formal condition of all experience. For Deleuze and 
Guattari (2004), by contrast, the subject is not what drives synthetic cognition, but what 
gets synthesized. They replace the thinking cogito with a sensuous sentio. Accordingly, “the 
basic phenomenon of hallucination (I see, I hear) and the basic phenomenon of delirium (I 
think ...) presuppose an I feel at an ever deeper level” (Deleuze & Guattari, 2004, p. 20). 
Descartes’ I think therefore I am thus becomes a I feel therefore I am. “That is to say, the 
subject is a product of experiences, rather than being their ground or their precondition” 
(Shaviro, 2008a, np.). This register of subjectivity is contingent, ephemeral, and emergent--
and one that is synthesized by the pre-subjective conditions of capitalism. 
  
Deleuze and Guattari (2004) detail three syntheses. The connective synthesis is the pre-
subjective fuel, or unconscious energy, that connects bodies together. It is the (in)organic 
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labor power of capital. Yet these connections are not made freely. The disjunctive synthesis 
organizes or records this energy into a dominant socius. This is their name for the a-
subjective socio-economic conditions of capitalist production (Deleuze and Guattari, 2004, 
p. 12). “The monstrous body of capital is indeed everywhere... It has grown to be a 
‘transcendental condition” (Shaviro, 2008b, np.). Whereas the connective synthesis is pre-
subjective, and the disjunctive synthesis is a-subjective, it is only in the third synthesis--the 
conjunctive synthesis--where the subject appears in the act of consumption. The subject 
emerges from the socius: it is always in passage, moving across the monstrous body of 
capital, reborn and destroyed across multiple conditions.   
  
Subjectivity, in short, emerges from multiple transcendental conditions that are immanent 
to being. As Felix Guattari (1989, p. 131) surmises, “We should perhaps not speak of subjects, 
but rather of components of subjectification, each of which works more or less on its own 
account.” That is to say, “It is quite simply wrong”, argues Guattari (1989, p. 134), “to regard 
action on the psyche, the socius, and the environment as separate.” Capitalism, in turn, seeks 
to police and capture these conditions through its unyielding syntheses. We must, therefore, 
consider the conditions of subjectivity, the subjective aggregates, psychological assemblages, 
and cognitive infrastructures by which subjects are synthesized under capitalism. For 
violence is embedded in these existential ecologies. 
  
In what follows, we begin our four-part examination of violent conditions. In Part 1, The 
Virtual, we examine Deleuze’s notion of the virtual to demonstrate how violence exists as a 
latent, non-materialized potential in worlds. In Part 2, called Truncated Life, we explore how 
capitalism curtail people’s life potential. Part 3, Time, unpacks the temporalities of violence. 
In Part 4, Common Sense, we argue that conditions are a type of sensation that habituate our 
ways of thinking and doing.  
  
Violent Conditions, Part 1: The Virtual 
  
In this section, we lay the foundations for our understanding of violent conditions. We define 
conditions as localized complexes of formed and unformed matters that crystallize into semi-
stable worlds. To understand how this relates to violence, we pair Deleuze’s (1994) notion of 
the actual and virtual with Galtung’s actual and potential. Galtung (1969, p. 168), to recall, 
argued that violence is “the cause of the difference between the potential and the actual.” We 
extend this argument to provide a more detailed ontology. Deleuze’s (1994) major 
contribution to philosophy is to consider the pre-individual fields of sense under his 
transcendental empiricism. The virtual is a field of energy, a reservoir of autonomous forces, 
that have not yet been materialized or “extended” in the actual. Reality, then, is not 
exhausted by the surface appearances of the actual. The world around us is the 
crystallization of virtual conditions. By theorizing the virtual domains of violence, we 
understand how injustice is lodged in the constricted conditions of being, and not just across 
the surfaces, events, and personalities of our worlds. 
  
The virtual is not the same as a probability, but “possesses a full reality by itself” (Deleuze, 
1994, p. 211). It is a transcendental field that conditions and generates the actual. That is, the 
virtual supplies the worldly resources by which actual entities emerge. The virtual is an 
intensive condition rather than an extensive condition. By this, Deleuze argues that the 
intensive is a type of affective and emergent force: a cauldron of activity and unformed 
energy. “Out of this intensive depth emerge at once the extensio and the extensum, the 
qualitas and the quale” (Deleuze, 1994, p. 231). Unlike the intensive, then, the extensive 
names those forces and matters that have materialized: the world's empirical circumstances. 
Deleuze clarifies, “while the conditions of possible experience may be related to extension, 
there are also subjacent conditions of real experience which are indistinguishable from 
intensity as such” (Deleuze, 1994, pp. 231-232). This dyad of actual and subjacent conditions 
is vital to our understanding of violence. 
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Deleuze calls the virtual by many names across his oeuvre, including the spatium. As he 
writes with Guattari (2004, p. 169), the spatium is “non-stratified, unformed, intense matter, 
the matrix of intensity.” So while the laws of nature may govern the surfaces of the world, the 
emergence of the virtual, “ceaselessly rumbles in this other dimension of the transcendental 
or the volcanic spatium” (Deleuze, 1994, p. 241). We thus find the term spatium helpful, 
since it articulates a space or geography to the virtual, and prevents the virtual from being 
understood as an undifferentiated and groundless monism. Instead, it is a localized, pre-
individual field “assembling the conditions of the real” (Burchill, 2007, p. 154). The spatium 
names overlapping but singular complexes of intensity and unformed matter. These virtual 
geographies are oriented by, and nourish, the tectonics of the actual from which they are 
inseparable. 
  
Conditions are geographies of being: they are connected to the spatium, with its intensive 
spaces of energy and unformed matter, and extended in the actual, with its observable and 
quantifiable architectures (Deleuze, 1994, p. 238). Conditions, in short, are not affective 
backgrounds that are separate from the physical world. Nor are they exhausted by what 
actually is. Instead, conditions are topological neighborhoods of intensity and extensity that 
index the reality of the world (Burchill, 2007, p. 155): what is possible, what is real, and what 
is impossible, what is unreal. What we describe as a world is thus the localization of multiple 
conditions. Conditions congeal together in place, generating bodies, forces, thresholds, 
affects, practices, and event-spaces through their own immanent ontogenesis (Marston, 
Jones III, & Woodward). Sometimes these conditions spark ephemeral events (Shaw, 2012). 
Other times, conditions seep deep into wounded bodies and worlds. So oppressive, so 
invisible. 
  
In summary, to apprehend violence only with its surface-level expressions is to bypass its 
subjacent virtuality. Conditions are constituted by the topological circuits between the 
virtual and the actual: indexed by ancient materialities, emergent events, immanent 
thresholds, and multiple and decaying bodies. This understanding moves past linear 
instances of causality between actualized bodies--and thus, of direct, personalized violence. 
Violence is always bound by, and produced by, conditions: it is not a thing, person, or event 
that is hermetically sealed from the world. That is to say, violence is a condition: the 
condition of truncated life, of restricted life potential, of a “permanent, unwanted state of 
misery” (Galtung, 1990, p. 293). 
 
Violent Conditions, Part 2: Truncated Life 
  
Conditions can be imperceptible to “barefoot empiricism” (Galtung, 1990, p. 295) and yet 
pattern the surface topologies of worlds. Violent conditions infiltrate the peaks and bedrock 
of existence: poisoning, irradiating, and wounding the neighborhoods of everyday being. In 
this section, we explore how violent conditions police or constrict the passage between the 
virtual and the actual. They limit and truncate who and what is actualized in the world, and 
how. As we will discuss, this power or force does not start with conscious subjects, 
parliaments, or police officers, but is embedded within the restrictive materialities and 
energies of conditions themselves. We thus locate power as the force of conditioning: the 
ability to normalise, regulate and habituate the ceaseless passages between the virtual and 
the actual. This power extends across acts of police and legal violence (Wall, 2016), state and 
corporate atmospheric enclosure (Shaw, 2017), ecological violence (Bagelman & Wiebe, 
2017; Nixon, 2011), to the anonymous bureaucracies that impose banal violence through the 
retrenchment of state protection (Cooper & Whyte, 2017; Gupta, 2012). Such expressions of 
violence maim and truncate life through indifference, exclusion and abandonment (Inwood, 
Alderman, & Barron 2016). 
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Our focus, therefore, is how violent conditions curtail people’s lives, “little by little,” and 
“hurries them to their grave before their time” (Engels, 2009, p. 127). This positions violence 
as a form of truncated life (Tyner, 2016) or “unequal life chances” (Galtung, 1969, p. 171). 
For Tyner, truncated life is akin to the premature deaths of the 18th Century. Truncated life 
“is that which ends abruptly, murdered by the material inequalities often born out of 
biopolitical regimes that are increasingly driven by the logic of profit and the pursuit of 
capital accumulation” (2016, p. 285). Here, we seek to advance Tyner’s argument further: a 
truncated life need not only be as that which is “vitally surrendered” (Ibid.) but life lived 
with truncated potential. That is to say, life not necessarily shorted in absolute years, but life 
that is robbed of its potential: life that is forcibly “humiliated, ashamed, anxious, harassed, 
stigmatised, and depressed” (Copper & Whyte, 2017, p. 2).  
 
The examples of life whose potential has been robbed are multiple and diverse: such as 
domestic violence which shortens the lives of some, and diminishes the life chances of 
others (Pain 2014, 2015), carceral feminism (Sweet, 2016), ecological violence (Nixon 2011), 
the pervasive violence of poverty and property (Springer, 2013), the prolonged harm of 
racialized state violence (Derickson, 2017), or the violence located in spaces of care (Gupta, 
2012; Minca & Ong, 2016). In all these cases, violent conditions warp and destroy self-
realisation and actualisation. They preserve the gulf between “what is, and what could have 
been” (Galtung, 1969, p. 168), conspiring with the conditioning that keeps people in their 
place: mentally, physically, economically, and culturally. The world watches in agreement as 
people are told their status—their actuality—is good enough. No hand need be bloodied in 
the policing of this gulf.   
  
Health statistics have long revealed the consequence of violent conditions. For example, the 
so-called “Glasgow effect” (the “unexplainable” low-life expectancy and poor health in 
Scotland’s biggest city) produces an almost 30-year difference in male life expectancy 
between two areas only 12 km apart (Reid, 2011). This health discrepancy in Glasgow, which 
is more pronounced than other cities with similar socio-economic deprivation, contributes to 
the estimated 5,000 extra mortalities a year in Scotland (Walsh et al., 2016). There appears 
to be no singular cause of the Glasgow effect. A 355-page report by Walsh et al. (2016) 
discusses multiple conditions that feed into the truncated lives of Scotland’s people. We find 
the frequent use of conditions in the report illuminating. It suggests that deprivation and 
truncated lives are not reducible to a single cause, but condense from multiple interacting 
conditions. These include: “living conditions” (p. 9), “working conditions” (p. 28), “socio-
economic conditions” (p. 28), “housing conditions” (p. 47), and chronic “health conditions” 
(p. 198). In addition to these material conditions, Harry Burns, Scotland's Chief Medical 
Officer, considers the Glasgow effect partly a “psycho-social problem”, and Alistair 
McIntosh, founder of community organization GalGael, considers it a product of a “a loss of 
soul” (Reid, 2011, p. 707, our emphases). Both Burns and McIntosh testify to the violent 
conditions that pervade minds and bodies: a soul murder that leads to premature death.   
  
Beyond Glasgow, after 100 years of straight increases, rises in life expectancy are now falling 
in England. The slump began in 2010, the same year the Conservative government 
introduced its policy of austerity, slashing public spending on social services to what Michael 
Marmot, who headed the study, calls “miserly” levels (Campbell, 2017). As Owen Jones 
(2017, np.) writes, “People’s lives have been truncated, because they are not living as long as 
they should have done if the rate of increase had continued.” Such conditions of austerity are 
insidious and diffuse, leading to a range of physical and mental health problems. One 2017 
study drew the ire of the UK government by claiming that 30,000 excess deaths in the UK 
during 2015 were a result of austerity-driven cuts to the NHS and social care (Siddique 
2017a). Finally, men are killing themselves at the highest rate for over 15 years, especially in 
deprived areas of the UK (Fearn, 2015).  
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Austerity-driven policies continue to truncate lives and potentials. Bond and Hallsworth 
(2017, p.74) discuss the “rarely seen violence” of the UK Welfare Reform and Work Act 2016. 
Evident in their analysis are the conditions of vulnerable youth in Lowestoft. The slow 
violence of deindustrialisation that ripped through working class communities and destroyed 
labour markets now leaves young people searching for jobs that no longer exist. Poor 
investment in public transport infrastructure has physically isolated youth, whilst the 
education system has failed to engage students in the necessary school subjects required to 
enter developing industries. Workfare policies introduced in 2016 have created a punitive 
regime of sanctions that has deprived many of their benefits for minor infringements: 
pushing many “further into poverty and for some homelessness, crime and drug use” (Bond 
and Hallsworth, 2017, p. 76). Bond and Hallsworth’s findings on workfare are thus damning: 
“a system not there to enable people to gain employment but a degradation ritual designed to 
further humiliate and alienate this desperately vulnerable population” (Bond and 
Hallsworth, 2017, p. 77). The potential of young people, the “what could have been” 
(Galtung, 1969, p. 168), becomes ever harder to self-actualize.  
 
Of course, for many communities, the state has long abandoned its duty of care (Derickson, 
2017)—if indeed it ever cared. Writing to his nephew in 1962 America, James Baldwin speaks 
of the truncated potential borne from his racial identity.   
 
“Now, my dear namesake, innocent and well-meaning people, your countrymen, have 
caused you to be born under conditions not far removed from those described for us 
by Charles Dickens in the London of more than a hundred years ago … This innocent 
country set you down in a ghetto in which, in fact, it intended that you should perish... 
You were not expected to aspire to excellence: you were expected to make peace with 
mediocrity.” Baldwin (2017, pp. 15-16) 
 
Truncated lives and truncated potential still exist together. And it’s not just well-profiled 
cases of police violence or higher rates of incarceration. In the U.S.—a country where 
approximately 40,000 people die by suicide each year, and at a 30-year high (Tavernise, 
2016)—infant mortality rate for black babies is still over twice that of white babies in the U.S. 
and has been for decades (Caruso, 2017). The reason for this gulf, writes one social policy 
researcher, is “the whole environment of the mother of the infant” (Caruso, 2017). This 
“whole environment” is the crystallization of multiple conditions that gnaw at both mother 
and baby. An ecology of violence that demonstrates how abstract economic conditions are 
inseparable from our bodies (Laurie, 2015; Loyd 2009). Inwood, Alderman, & Barron (2016, 
p. 59-60) thus position violence as “a set of practices in which those who are defined as 
unnecessary for capital accumulation are expunged from society, left to fend for themselves.” 
These are the violent conditions that crest in waves of police brutality only to retreat into the 
deep tides of slow violence.     
 
Violent Conditions, Part 3: Time 
  
Time is integral to the act and study of violence. Indeed, violence has long been understood 
to operate across different temporalities, “folded in and spread out, clamping up in densities 
that hide or opening up in piazza” (Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos, 2017, p. 26). We now build 
upon the two previous sections (the virtual and truncated life) to analyse the status and 
function of time. Galtung outlines the different temporalities of his three forms of violence: 
“direct violence [is] an event; structural violence is a process with ups and downs; [and] 
cultural violence is an invariant” (1990, p. 291). This temporal model was important for 
Galtung: the flashes of direct violence and the slower rhythms of structural violence are 
nourished by a more unflinching substratum of cultural violence (Galtung, 1990, p. 295). 
Recognising cultural violence alongside ecological and slow violence (Nixon, 2011) draws our 
attention to the protracted, unflinching rhythms of violence. The deadly grind.  
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Time is the vital force that nourishes what could be, and what is. It evolves in blinks, 
heartbeats, and aeons. Consider the slow violence of ecological destruction in the 
Anthropocene, or what Jason Moore terms the Capitalocene, an intergenerational theft, 
stealing future resources for current gain. “Between 1450 and 1750, a new era of human 
relations in the web of life begins: the Age of Capital. Its epicenters were the seats of imperial 
power and financial might. Its tentacles wrapped around ecosystems – humans included! – 
from the Baltic to Brazil, from Scandinavia to Southeast Asia” (Moore, 2017, p. 610). All 
around us, potentiality and actuality are in a continual state of synthesis. In bedrock and 
ocean. Skulls and machines. 
 
Yet the “slowing” of time still assumes that time is a quantifiable and linear yardstick by 
which violence is indexed. This assumption risks abstracting and universalizing time from its 
uneven conditions. Accordingly, our task is to go beyond an understanding time as an index 
of violence. Instead, we are interested in how time is lodged in the intra- and inter-
processing of conditions. For us, time names the immanent process of becoming and 
truncation. Temporality is the very movement of conditions: of life and death, extension and 
contraction. It is the shifting dyad between the spatium and the actual. It is temporality that 
discloses those bodies and minds that can reach their potential, that can become, and those 
for whom life is truncated. This kind of chronopolitics accentuates something slightly 
different than the biopolitics of Foucault (2003) or the necropolitics of Mbembe (2003). It 
forefronts how life--and indeed death--are not absolute, but are existential resources that are 
stretched out, chopped up, and splayed across uneven conditions. Moreover, our 
chronopolitics recognises the way in which violence refuses to be bounded by a temporal 
event, but how it can haunt the future potentials of subjects. Time, in short, is not just a 
measurement, but is the articulation and unfolding of conditions. 
 
There has long been a distinct political economy to time. Capitalism, for example, required 
the production and monitoring of workers’ time. As E.P. Thompson (1967) observed, 
“already in 1700, the familiar landscape of disciplined industrial capitalism, with the time-
sheet, the time-keeper, the informers and the fines was established” (quoted in in Shapiro, 
2016, p. 94). By rendering time as a universal measure, or a currency that can be bought and 
traded, time was used to resource (and exploit) lives differently. To begin with, consider 
Marx’s (1990) classic formulation of surplus value. During a working day, the capitalist buys 
time off workers and compensates them. But the worker is not compensated for all their 
time. For a portion of that working day, the labourer is working for “free” for the capitalist, 
“which, for the capitalist, has all the charms of something created out of nothing” (Marx, 
1990, p. 325). Workers always sell more than their labour: they sell their time, which is to 
say, they sell their own potential for self-realization. Here, time—as the very resource of life-
-is traded (or, stolen) between rich and poor.  
 
To recall Engels’ existential understanding of time, he argued that capitalism robs the “vital 
force” of workers (Engels, 2009, p. 127). Here, time and life, potentiality and actuality, 
collapse together in the notion of “vital force.” The result is the unequal experiences and 
distributions of time. This is the politics of unequal becoming: the time used to realize our 
own potential versus the vital force spent realizing the potential of others. As Gorz (1989, 
p.6) explains, “The unequal distribution of work in the economic sphere... leads to a situation 
in which one section of the population is able to buy extra spare time from the other and the 
latter is reduced to serving the former.” This buying and selling of time intersects the 
familiar injustices of race, class, and gender. Social reproduction is a key site of such 
(in)justice (see Meehan and Strauss, 2015), with some able to purchase time-saving 
technologies or the labour of others, thereby allowing them to minimize their temporal 
contribution to reproductive tasks (Gorz, 1989). Consider also the work of Gerry Pratt and 
Caleb Johnstone (2014) on Filipino domestic workers in Canada. They write about how 
women sell their time, their potential, to enable the becoming of their middle-class 
employers.  
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Another crucial temporality of violence, is how the past haunts, or what Sharp (2014) calls 
the “violence of remembering.” Nixon (2011, p. 210) talks of the “politics of belatedness:” the 
protracted war deaths taking place long after depleted-uranium warfare has ceased, dying 
only after poisons have entered into food chains, infiltrated water sources and cancer cells 
have formed and multiplied. But there is not just a singular “ecology of the aftermath” 
(Nixon 2011) to consider. The chronopolitics of violence recognises the importance of time in 
the metamorphosis of violence, as violence mutates into different forms and articulates its 
presence in new ways. Experiences of violence alter subjects and subjectivities. Futures 
become restricted and potentials go unrealised as violence gnaws the mind. For example, in 
one year during the war in Afghanistan, more UK (ex)service people died by suicide than 
were killed on the battlefield fighting the Taliban (BBC, 2013).  
 
These altered subjectivities can extend beyond individual subjects, entering the psyche of 
entire generations. Frantz Fanon explored the multiple violences of colonial rule. Physical 
violence, he explains, was endemic to the functioning of colonial rule. But colonialism was 
also a violence of the mind. Writing in The Wretched of the Earth, Fanon (1963, pp. 15-16) 
notes that the colonial ruler “crazed by his absolute power and by the fear of losing it … has 
come to believe that the domestication of the "inferior races" will come about by the 
conditioning of their reflexes.” The psychological effect of material conditions and mental 
conditioning remained within colonial subjects long after direct colonial rule had ended, 
leaving them “traumatized for life” (Fanon, 1963, pp. 16). Through conducting autopsies on 
the dead, and psychiatric treatment on the living, Fanon’s clinical work saw him reveal 
“knowledge held within flesh while continuously attempting to heal the soul” (Gordon, 2017, 
p. 52). In so much of his writing, including within Black Skin, White Masks (1967) and The 
Wretched of the Earth (1963), Fanon (1963, p. 19) recognises the violent contradictions of 
colonial rule, of “laying claim to and denying the human condition at the same time.” This 
led to a truncation of potential, of generations living under the zeitgeist of colonial rules, 
with internalised domination passing through bloodlines. Many of Fanon’s patients simply 
could not survive the denial of their human condition, becoming permanently “less-than 
human” (Philo, 2017). 
  
Violent Conditions, Part 4: Common Sense 
  
We live within, and so often accept, a world of truncated life. A key question this raises is 
how the gulf between the virtual and the actual is normalized—how violent conditions are 
permitted to circulate. In this section, we thus conclude our four-part examination of violent 
conditions by articulating how violence occupies our horizons of common sense. Galtung 
(1990) recognised that violence is continually legitimated. “Violence requires a system of 
norms, through which something wrong or undeserved or unjust happens” (Gordon, 2017, 
p. 51). These norms are the assumptions by which we orient our thinking and activity: for 
“ideas give rise to violence just as it provides reasoning and explanation” (Evans and Carver, 
2017, pp. 5-6). That is to say, violence always-already stems from a “set of fundamental, 
prereflexive assumptions that social agents engage by the mere fact of taking the world for 
granted, of accepting the world as it is, and of finding natural because their mind is 
constructed according to cognitive structures that are issued out of the very structures of 
the world” (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 2004, p. 272).  
 
Bourdieu and Wacquant’s pairing of “cognitive structures” and “structures of the world” is 
important. This shows how thought is fundamentally imbricated—even assailed—by the 
conditions of the world. There is, in other words, a continual relay between sensation and 
cognition—these are not discrete categories. Indeed, this is what the concept of condition 
stresses: the immanent sensation between world and subject. If we have so far detailed 
capital’s material conditions of existence for human-becoming (Hardt and Negri, 2009; 
Marx, 1990), we must now examine how capitalism also occupies the horizons of our 
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common sense. Cultural violence (Galtung, 1990) is not simply an ideological overlay of 
reality, a trick of the mind, or a paranoid dreamscape. Instead, common sense is the 
collective sensation of being in and amongst conditions.  
 
Common sense is a synthesis, continually produced, through the exchanges between subjects 
and worlds. Fisher (2009) argues that “capitalist realism” occupies, even dominates, our 
horizons of common sense, thereby producing our very reality: “[c]apitalist realism is 
therefore not a particular type of realism; it is more like realism in itself” (Fisher, 2009, p. 4). 
Fischer’s point is important. Capitalism resides--and (re)conditions--reality itself, 
articulating “cognitive structures” and “structures of the world” to repeat Bourdieu and 
Wacquant. Crucially, this is how we must understand common sense. Not simply as an 
epistemological category (i.e. common sense-as-ideology), but as an ontological constellation 
of sense within a world (i.e. common sense-as-phenomenological condition). 
  
In Part 1, we argued that conditions are localized structures that constellate the matter-
processing of the actual, as well as the unformed virtual matters of the spatium. Now, we 
want to unpack how and why conditions must be understood as spaces of sensation in which 
reality is felt and made intelligible—that is, synthesized—by subjects. Sense, writes Shaw 
(2012, p. 624), names “the affective relations between receptors and worldly stimuli.” This 
suggests that matter, both organic (of flesh and plant) and inorganic (of artificial intelligence 
and machine), itself senses—that a condition is always-already a type of sensation, by which 
worlds are transduced, felt, and sensed, according to the immanent logic of conditions. “This 
is most clear to us where matter reaches tipping points, bifurcates and exhibits dramatic 
changes, but it also regularly makes minor adjustments, and in both ways, matter moves by 
feeling its way around its own situation as this or that that specific aggregate” (Woodward, 
Jones III, & Marston, 2012, p. 212). Matter, formed and unformed, biological and technical, 
is synthesized in the makeup of a world. Conditions, in short, are necessarily spaces of 
sensation where subjective (and object-ive) existence is synthesized, localized, and rendered 
intelligible--by which a world “knows” and “feels” itself as existent.   
  
The basic element of sensation common to all conditions is sense: the interface between 
condition and subject. What makes the subject--as a sentio rather than a cogito--is this 
ability to sense (Deleuze and Guattari, 2004). It is sensation that announces the birth of the 
subject from its conditions, “thereby awakening memory and forcing thought” (Deleuze, 
1994, p. 237). The synthesis or individuation of subjects is the event of sense-making or 
sensation. Subjects, in other words, are individuated by localized conditions. Understanding 
violence as a transversal condition (Guattari, 1989) means we understand it through a trans-
subjective ecology: circulating through worlds and subjects. Moreover, since conditions, as 
ecologies of sense, condense in shared worlds, it means that we are always-already 
individuated by common conditions, which is to say, by common sense.  
 
A world is the crystallization of overlapping common senses: sensations experienced by 
subjects localized-in-common. Common sense, to put it in terms of Rancière (2004), 
distributes the sensible, constellating the conditions by which bodies are felt, seen, and 
heard--“around the properties of spaces and the possibilities of time” (Rancière, 2004, p. 13). 
Here, we can interpret Rancière quite literally: common sense constellates the possibilities of 
time, which is to say, the uneven, and politically potent, passage between the virtual and the 
actual. As Bourdieu and Wacquant (2004, p. 272) put it, “the immediate agreement of 
objective structures and cognitive structures, is the true foundation of a realistic theory of 
domination and politics.” 
  
This has important consequences for understanding subjectivity and violence. “Violence”, 
writes Guattari (1989, p.142) “is always the product of complex subjective assemblages; it is 
not intrinsically inscribed in the essence of the human species.” Subjects exist within 
assemblies of sense that index the shared possibilities for feeling, thought, and moods. We 
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can understand moods as socialized conditions that index our affective life (see Anderson, 
2014, p. 108). That is not to say that conditions determine subjectivity, but that common 
sense provide the worldly resources by which subjects are ceaselessly individuated. Crucially, 
the idea of habit is the process by which such moods are normalized. Habit discloses how 
conditions are not simply sensed by a transcendent subject, but how they individuate the 
subject through repetition. Habit condenses physiology and psychology, binding together the 
virtual and the actual, as well as the organic and inorganic, in semi-stable repetitions 
(Dewsbury, 2015). Habit is the process by which common sense calcifies in the world. Habit 
is a repetitive subjective synthesis, capable of sustaining modes of violence, but also apathy 
and indifference towards violence. 
  
To summarize, violent conditions articulate what can be sensed, felt, thought, and performed 
in a world. By arguing that common sense is an existential construct, we can see how it 
configures the very fabric of reality—and crucially, who is made to feel real. As Butler (2004, 
p. 33) asks: “Whose lives are real? How might reality be remade? Those who are unreal have, 
in a sense, already suffered the violence of derealization. ... Does violence take place on the 
condition of that unreality?” What is at stake with our understanding of violent conditions—
our violent empiricism—is the status of reality itself, and how it affects subjects whose lives 
are not simply rendered as bare, or as surplus, but as existentially unreal. 
  
Injustice: Concluding Thoughts 
 
Across the restless neighborhoods of being, conditions individuate subjects, transduce 
worlds, and articulate potential. Our main contribution has been to theorize violence as the 
condition of truncated life. Truncated life names the injustice of premature death (Tyner 
2016). But truncated life is also truncated potential. The horror of abject poverty. The terror 
of domestic violence (Pain 2014). The long and slow trauma of the Anthropocene or 
“Capitalocene” (Moore 2016). To construct our argument, we advanced Galtung’s (1969) 
definition of violence as the difference between potential and actual, alongside Deleuze’s 
(1994) transcendental empiricism. Deleuze (1994, p. 232) provided us with vital insights into 
the “subjacent conditions of real experience.” Conditions, we argued, are the very 
geographies of being: the existential ecologies of formed and unformed matter (energies) 
that articulate the rich tapestry of reality. Throughout the paper, we shifted from a notion of 
violence as a subjective condition, to understanding of how violence conditions subjects. And 
while all conditions are in a state of endless synthesis, violent conditions prevent life from 
actualizing its full potential. Violent conditions forcefully constrain, traumatize, and poison, 
the very resources of our becoming. This is an injustice lodged in the very fibres and 
skeletons of being. 
 
Injustice is thus immanent to the constricted conditions of being, and not just the observable 
architectures of our worlds. This moves past definitions of either direct or structural 
violence. Both approaches are framed by the already-existent. Yet as the “Glasgow effect” 
demonstrates, violent conditions can interplay together in complex and overdetermined 
arrangements. They coalesce, sediment, strangle, explode, scar, fossilize, torment, bleed, and 
harry our worlds, both actual and virtual, visible and invisible. Conditions, in short, are in a 
state of continual unrest. For us, time names this process of transduction. The concept of 
time enables us to view how conditions move, articulate, and extend themselves, both 
internally (intra-processing) and externally (inter-processing). Time is the shifting 
passageway between the spatium and the existent. It is temporality that discloses those lives 
that reach their potential, and those for whom life is truncated. A key question this raised is 
how violence is normalized. To answer this, we used the term common sense to argue that 
conditions habituate a particular feeling, thinking, and doing. Common sense is the 
collective sensation of being-in and amongst conditions. That is, conditions are common 
spaces of sensation in which a shared reality is felt, made intelligible, and through endless 
repetition, normalized.  
Full corrected text available: Political Geography, 65 (2018): 8-16 <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.polgeo.2018.03.005> 
 15 
 
Yet our intention was never to mystify violence or protect it from challenge by positioning it 
as a transhistorical or universal condition. Instead, our understanding of violent conditions 
offers productive political potential. Violence must always be nourished—with energy, 
matter, discourse, habit, affect, and the legitimacy bestowed by easy routine. That is, violent 
conditions demand common sense. This requirement creates an opening—a continual call—
for us to disrupt common sense. To refuse its call. To render common sense as nonsense. 
Let’s return to James Baldwin’s letter to his nephew. He wrote how his fellow Americans, 
“have destroyed and are destroying hundreds of thousands of lives and do not know it and do 
not want to know it. One can be—indeed, one must strive to become—tough and 
philosophical concerning destruction and death” (2017, p. 14, our emphasis). We must 
continue this philosophical and practical struggle. To fully address what we “do not want to 
know.”  To confront the uncomfortable conditions of violence in which we live, breathe, and 
die. We can all ensure we are not complicit in violence through our indifference. Those of us 
in comfort must recognize how our disposable living fosters the disposability of other lives. 
 
We must challenge those autopsies that return “natural” causes of deaths. Social murder 
hangs across the truncated lives of capitalism. And we are complicit. Willingly or unwillingly. 
But let us see in the shared conditions of violence a latent power for change. We can resource 
different modes of coexistence through our very existence. Even when accountability seems 
so diffuse, and change seems so ungraspable, we can hold ourselves to account. The 
pathways to new worlds begin with intimate dialogues. We can then foster a collective praxis 
of care oriented by challenging the common conditions that harry us so violently. Care for 
others is always care for ourselves. Yes: misery accumulates in conditions. But so too does 
hope. Hope that can, and will, accumulate into new conditions. Through persistence, praxis, 
and pedagogy, we can stop nourishing violent worlds and resource more peaceful worlds. 
“Peace is not a static thing, nor an endpoint, but a socio-spatial relation that is always made 
and made again” (Koopman 2011, p. 194). Our imaginations, bodies, and practices, are all 
the resources we need to begin anew. There is no pure starting point. No leader. We start 
inside the very conditions that we must transform. An ethics of peaceful conditions 
celebrates how our existence is always coexistence—how our lives are syntheses of people, 
animals, machines, oceans, and forests. Everyday we breathe in the world. Let us exhale 
something different, something beautiful.  
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